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Intellectual Property in the Cathedral 
 
 








In this chapter I propose to explore a number of ramifications of the entitlement structure 
chosen for intellectual property.  Reto Hilty1, echoing theoretical work by Jerry Reichman2 and 
others, has called for greater use of the compulsory license in intellectual property systems, a call 
with which I concur.  Indeed, my only point of disagreement will be that this call is not enough.  
My argument will be that liability rules such as the compulsory license are indeed appropriate in 
many more instances than we have tended to employ them, but that even this recognition is too 
timid.  Property theory provides us with a range of possible entitlement constructions, including 
the classic property rule and liability rule, but by no means limited to these.  I will suggest that 
not only liability rules, but several other kinds of related allocation rules, ought to be more 
routinely used in intellectual property cases than they have been.  While many of my examples 
will be drawn from common law remedies, the structure is equally applicable to incorporation 
within civil codes, and as I will suggest, administrative process as well. 
 
 
Exploring the Cathedral 
 
Our exploration of possible entitlement structures begins with the famous Calabresi and 
Melamed article on Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral.3  This work has been largely responsible for establishing and defining these terms of 
property and liability.  Following the Calabresi/Melamed framework, we typically speak of 
property rules as conferring on their holders a right to exclude, and liability rules as conferring 
on their holders a right to be paid.  When speaking of intellectual property as property, we tend 
to assume that the entitlement to the subject matter of patent, copyright, trademark and similar 
regimes paradigmatically involves the right to exclude.  However, liability rules are not unknown 
                                                 
 Copyright 2012 by Dan L. Burk.  Excerpted from ACCESS CHALLENGES IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Dana Beldiman et 
al. eds., forthcoming 2013). 
† Chancellor’s Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine.  I thank Reto Hilty, Dana Beldiman, and 
participants in the Bucerius Law School conference on “Access Challenges in the 21st Century” for their comments 
on a previous version of these ideas. 
1 See, e.g., Reto Hilty, Licensing for Innovation, Competition, and Creation in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
INNOVATION: A FRAMEWORK FOR 21st CENTURY GROWTH 48 (Ian Hargreaves & Paul Hofheinz, eds., 2012). 
2 See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable 
Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743 (2000). 
3  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2170093
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to such regimes.4  It may be that they should be more common, and if we are serious about 
considering the Calabresi/Melamed framework, there are perhaps other rules worth considering 
as well. 
 
Calabresi and Melamed were of course speaking generally about almost any system of 
entitlement, but here we will focus on the context of an intellectual property entitlement, such as 
a patent.  We might begin by considering how, when a patent or similar intellectual property 
entitlement is disputed, the remedies available to a court adjudicating the dispute could be 
structured to treat the entitlement under any of four allocative rules.  Under the 
Calabresi/Melamed framework, we could characterize the court’s choices as encompassing two 
possible reciprocal property rules and two possible reciprocal liability rules, allocating one of 
each possible rule to the prevailing party: 
 
Rule 1:  the court could find infringement and enjoin the infringing activity. 
 
Rule 2:  the court could find infringement but allow the infringer to continue if he pays damages 
to the intellectual property holder. 
 
Rule 3:  the court could find no infringement and allow the alleged infringer's activity to continue 
without paying damages. 
 
Rule 4:  the court could find infringement but allow the infringer to continue unless the 
intellectual property owner pays damages to the infringer in order to enjoin the infringing 
activity. 
 
Following work by Ian Ayres5, we can arrange these entitlement rules into a two by two 
matrix, distinguishing them on the one dimension by who holds the entitlement, and on a 
perpendicular axis by the type of entitlement:  property or liability.  Looking at the first column, 
in the case of intellectual property, such as a patent, either the patent holder or the alleged 
infringer may have the right to use the subject matter of the entitlement, such as a claimed 
invention.  If the rule allocates this right to the patent holder, she will be able to prevail on a 
court to enforce the right by means of an injunction.  But if the alleged infringer can show either 
non-infringement or validity, he by default holds the right to continue his activities. 
 
The purported advantage of property rules is that they harness private information to 
optimize uses of assets such as intellectual property.  Under conditions of low transactions costs, 
we expect that wherever the exclusive right is allocated, the parties will negotiate for the right so 
that whichever party values it the most will pay the other to secure the right.  This moves the 
right to its highest value use, nicely aligning private preferences with public welfare.  Indeed, 
under sufficiently low transaction costs, we don’t care who is given the right initially; bargaining 
will move it to whichever party values it the most.  This is the optimal outcome that free market 
                                                 
4  See Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121 (1999). 
5 Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793 (1998); see also IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: 
THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS (2005) (discussing options structures in property remedies). 
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economists, and many naïve law professors, hope and expect will occur under the famous Coase 
theorem.6 
 
But Coase’s point in fact was that this condition of low transaction costs is seldom the 
case; markets are costly mechanisms for exchange, and transaction costs will frequently impede 
the reallocation of the right.  And, since our information about optimal outcomes is always 
imperfect, we should expect that the right will frequently be placed into the wrong hands, and 
could very likely become lodged there.  It therefore behooves us to expend some resources to get 




However, another possibility besides property is also available.  Looking to the second 
column, the intellectual property holder may be granted a different remedy, a right to be paid 
under a liability rule, such as occurs under a compulsory license.  Note that sometimes we may 
couch this in slightly different terms; we may give the alleged infringer an affirmative right to 
continue his activities, as in the case of prior user rights.  That might be characterized as giving 
the alleged infringer a Rule 3 property right to continue his activities, but is also effectively a 
Rule 2 compulsory license at a zero royalty – which should remind us that these rules sometimes 
blend together at the edges, and so the labels we give them are not always crisp and clean. 
 
                                                 
6 See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. ECON. 1 (1960). 
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Free market enthusiasts worry about liability rules as remedies, because in actual practice 
information is imperfect and so someone with imperfect information has to set the rate for the 
liability payment.7  A judge or other adjudicator may not set the optimal payment, if that is 
defined as the payment that the parties might independently negotiate.  But if the transaction 
costs to negotiation are high, as we have said, the parties may never reach any agreement, 
optimal or otherwise.  In cases of high transaction costs, many commentators believe that a 




Considering Reverse Liability 
 
However, this does not yet complete our two by two matrix.  There is yet an additional 
possibility in the liability column, a fourth possible rule.  We have considered the possibility of 
bestowing a property right on each of the parties, and symmetry suggests that we should do the 
same for liability rules.  Notice that, as in the case of the property rule, it is equally possible to 
assign a reciprocal right to be paid to the alleged infringer rather than to the entitlement holder.  
We might call this a reverse liability rule, to distinguish it from the Rule 2 under which the 
entitlement holder has a right to be paid.  Under Rule 4, the alleged infringer might have a right 
to be paid. 
 
American lawyers will recognize this rule as the famous "reverse liability rule" from the 
Del Webb v. Spur Industries8 case that is routinely taught in first year property courses.  The 
Spur Industries case involved a land developer of residential homes who built houses near a 
cattle feed lot.  Because the feed lot generated dust and offensive smells that affected the 
residential housing, the developer sued to abate the nuisance -- essentially, asked the court for an 
injunction to close or move the feed lot.  The court hearing the case could have chosen Rules 1 or 
2 -- that is, could have assigned a property right to one of the parties, either saying that the feed 
lot had a right to produce dust and odor, and so denied the injunction, or in the alternative could 
have said that the home owners had a right to be free from dust and odor, and so granted the 
injunction. 
 
The court instead fashioned a different remedy.  It held that the residential developer was 
entitled to an injunction, with a caveat.  Since the developer had in some sense "come to the 
nuisance," putting himself and his purchasers in a position to be affected by the feed lot dust and 
smell, the court held that the feed lot should not bear the cost of the move.  The developer’s 
injunction would be contingent on a payment to the feed lot owner to offset the cost of moving 
his operation.  In our application of the rule to intellectual property, we would map the developer 
and the feed lot onto the patent holder and the infringer.  Rather than the entitlement owner – 
such as a patent holder -- receiving a payment from the alleged infringer, instead the infringer 
                                                 
7 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights 
Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996); but see Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules 100 
CAL. L. REV. 463 (2012) (cataloging examples of how parties use liability regimes as a starting point for 
negotiations). 
8  108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972). 
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Reverse Liability in Intellectual Property 
 
There has been little consideration as to how such a rule might play out in intellectual 
property, rather than real property.  But one can quickly see possible applications.  One of the 
major controversies currently surrounding patent law, especially in the United States, is the 
problem of non-practicing entities (NPEs) or so-called patent trolls.9  It is difficult to determine 
exactly who is a patent troll -- sometimes it seems to be any patent owner that someone else 
doesn't like, but they are typically characterized as firms that have acquired a patent, or 
sometimes an entire portfolio of patents, not in order to produce an innovative product, but only 
to enforce or threaten to enforce the patent to generate a revenue scheme.  Sometimes the patents 
are obscure, or likely to be found invalid if someone was willing to spend the money to challenge 
them.  Typically the "NPE" firms have no research or production capacity, so the concern seems 
to be that the patents are not facilitating innovation, but only a kind of rent-seeking. 
 
The concern is that a property rule, awarding exclusive rights through the mechanism of 
an injunction, gives the "troll" too much leverage.  Because the injunction can completely shut 
down the infringing party's operations if they are reliant on the patented technology, the 
injunctive threat can be equal to the value of their entire business.  In the United States, this 
concern was partially addressed by the United States Supreme Court decision in eBay vs. Merc 
Exchange.10  Prior to this decision, there had been a lower court presumption in favor of an 
almost automatic permanent injunction for patent owners who proved their cases against 
infringers, on the theory that the right to exclude via an injunction is the essential characteristic 
of a property right.  However, the Supreme Court pointed out that the patent statute authorized 
issuance of an injunction on equitable grounds, and a court sitting in equity should consider the 
public interest, the adequacy of a legal remedy awarding damages, and the relative hardship of 
an injunction on the two parties. 
 
There is empirical evidence that since the eBay decision, the injunctions granted to NPE 
patent holders has dropped, while maintaining the availability of injunctions for manufacturing 
or active research firms.11  This equitable balancing test is effective in separating innovative 
patent holders from those who are seeking only revenue -- in other words, from non-practicing 
entities.  NPEs who are seeking only to generate a revenue stream are adequately compensated 
by damages after a successful law suit, meaning that the injunctive remedy is unnecessary and 
perhaps harmful.  However, a patent holder who is interested in producing a product, and so 
needs exclusivity to clear or structure his market, would likely not be adequately served by 
monetary damages, and so should receive the injunction.  The rule in effect substitutes a 
compulsory license in those cases where the public interest and the balance of the equities 
militates against a strict property rule 
                                                 
9  Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). 
10  547 U.S. 388 (2006). 





The use of a liability rule in this instance seems to have been fairly successful.  But a 
reverse liability rule might be even more successful in dealing with the NPE leverage problem.  
Instead of the eBay compulsory licensing liability rule, imagine the application of the Spur 
Industries rule: a court sitting in equity might say to the patent holder, you are welcome to your 
injunction if you are willing to pay the cost that will be imposed on the infringer by adopting the 
next best technological alternative.  This removes the threat of shutdown from negotiations over 
the patented technology, as well as any advantage that might come from ambushing competitors 
who had unwittingly adopted a patented technology.   
 
One might be concerned that the rule could create an incentive to infringe, as the worst 
that could happen would be a subsidized change to the next best alternative technology if caught.  
But the answer to this objection is that, in balancing the equities of a case, the rule should only 
be deployed where there is evidence of innocent infringement on the one hand, or of ambush or 
untoward bargaining leverage on the other.  These are the kinds of criteria we use in deciding 
whether the eBay rule should apply, and can equally well be used to help decide whether a 
reverse liability rule is appropriate. 
 
Then why not simply use the eBay rule; why add another possible outcome to patent 
litigation, which some feel is already overly uncertain and expensive?  The answer is that another 
tool in the court’s kit of remedies allows it to better tailor outcomes to specific situations.  In 
particular, the reverse liability rule at least partially answers the objection that liability rules are 
potentially inefficient because they impose a price set by an adjudicator who has imperfect 
valuation information.  The Spur Industries rule at least partially harnesses private valuation by 
putting the patent holder back in the driver’s seat.  The patent holder is given the choice whether 
to pay the cost of the injunction or not; if the injunction is not worth the cost he can forgo it.  The 
rule therefore serves to separate the trolls from the innovators: those who really needed 
exclusivity to establish a market for the product they were producing could assert their property 
rights, but at a price.  Trolls are allowed voluntarily segregate themselves from non-trolls, rather 
than requiring a court to determine who is an NPE and who isn't. 
 
Note also the corollary change in bargaining position of the alleged infringer.  If the 
intellectual property owner chooses damages, essentially a compulsory license, the infringer may 
use the damage payment as a starting point for royalty negotiations; this type of bargaining is 
common in cases of payments imposed by a third party adjudicator.12  The effects are even more 
striking if the intellectual property holder chooses the injunction subject to a payment.  The 
infringer may now wish to negotiate a license, but rather than bargaining from an all or nothing 
position, as he would be in the case of an injunction under a pure property rule, the infringer is 
now bargaining from the starting point of receiving a damages payment.  Even with the 
injunction, the intellectual property owner, troll or otherwise, is no longer in the position of 
holding the infringer up for the entire value of his business.  In other words, the valuation and 
bargaining range of the parties is now much narrower, making an agreement more likely.  In 
situations where the parties’ valuations would be very far apart, judicially narrowing the range 
may facilitate private agreement.13 
                                                 
12  See Lemley, supra note 7. 




Or, as a second example of where to use a reverse liability rule, imagine the application 
of this rule in the context of controversies over patents in a standard-setting.  Interoperation of 
technological systems frequently requires some type of standardization; indeed, technologies 
often tend toward a single standard.14  This means that there is often a “lock in” effect to 
technical standards; unless a manufacturer adopts the standard, his product is marginalized.15  
Access to and adoption of the standard, so that products are compatible with existing systems, 
becomes essential to effectively compete in the market. 
 
As a corollary, if a manufacturer holds intellectual property rights in a standard, those 
rights can convey enormous market power.  Indeed, adding intellectual property rights on top of 
a technological standard seems often like piling on too much of a good thing.  Because of this, 
standard-setting organizations typically require disclosure of intellectual property interests by 
their members when technological standards are being adopted.16  Patent owners are typically 
required to reveal the presence of their patent, and agree that if their technology is adopted as the 
standard, they will make licenses available on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) 
terms.17 
  
There have been some occasions where a patent holder has failed to disclose his 
proprietary interest in a technical standard, and perhaps has even willfully concealed his 
proprietary interest until the standard has been adopted and is difficult to alter.  Attempts to 
enforce a patent against alleged infringers, who have adopted the patented standard under the 
impression that it would be available on FRAND terms, raises difficult claims regarding fraud 
and misrepresentation.  A reverse liability rule seems almost tailor made to such a situation.  A 
court might say to the patent holder, fine, you are entitled to your injunction against those using 
your technology -- but only if you are willing to pay the costs for those who have adopted the 
standard and who wish to switch to an alternative.  I suspect that this would deter most patent 
holders from asserting their patents once the patented technology was adopted as a standard.  But 
those who truly wished to assert their exclusivity could do so, at a cost.  The cost might be 
considered an equitable or restitutionary penalty for not dealing openly in the first place. 
 
 
Considering Calls and Puts 
 
Rules 2 and 4 have some important characteristics that may not immediately be apparent 
but that flow from the right to be paid.  Under a liability rule, the entitlement holder might prefer 
to obtain an injunction rather than a payment, but the injunction is not available.  This effectively 
means that the party that takes the asset can decide to do so, knowing that the penalty is to pay a 
certain price under the liability rule.  This entitlement structure closely parallels certain types of 
financial instruments.   Financial economists talk about "call" options, which are contracts that 
                                                 
14  Mark A. Lemley, Antitrust and the Internet Standardization Problem, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1041 (1996). 
15  Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of. Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 
(1998). 
16  Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights andStandard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1889 (2002). 
17  Joseph Scott Miller, Standard Setting, Patents, and Access Lock-In: RAND Licensing and the Theory of the Firm, 
40 IND. L. REV. 351 (2006). 
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specify a certain price, called the exercise price, for future purchase of certain commodities.  A 
call option is in essence the right to buy at a specified price.  The holder of the commodity may 
not want to sell at that price at the time of the purchase, but the contract nonetheless allows the 
buyer to force the sale at the price at the time he chooses within the terms specified by the 
contract. 
 
One can quickly see the parallel to a liability rule.18  A liability rule, such as a 
compulsory license, effectively places the choice of whether to force an exchange into the hands 
of the alleged infringer.  The intellectual property holder may not wish to "sell" the rights at the 
price specified by the compulsory license, but the statute or holding that animates the liability 
rule leaves no choice: the intellectual property holder is entitled to receive payment, but may not 
decline to sell.  The same is of course true in the reverse liability rule situation; the home builder 
can purchase the rights to be free of dust and stink at a specified price.  The feed lot owner may 
not want to move, to essentially sell those rights, but has no choice if the developer decides to 
exercise the option to buy. 
 
If Rules 3 and 4 are equivalent to call options, then the next logical extension of this 
paradigm is to consider whether we might apply to intellectual property assets a different set of 
options, complementary and reciprocal to call options, which in finance are called "put" options.  
If a call option is the right to buy certain commodities at a certain price, then the put option is the 
right to sell specified commodities at a certain price.  The party under a put contract who holds 
the right can force the other party to buy the asset at the exercise price, even if the other party 
would prefer currently not to pay that price for the asset.   
 
As in the case of liability “call” options, the put could be allocated to either party in a 
dispute over an entitlement.  In one case, the intellectual property owner could require the 
infringer to buy the intellectual property, in the other case, the alleged infringer could require the 
intellectual property owner to pay for exclusion.  This gives us two new rules, Rule 5 and Rule 6.   
 
Rule 5:  the alleged infringer continues to use the intellectual property, but can choose to stop 
infringing and receive damages from the intellectual property owner. 
 
Rule 6: the intellectual property owner can enjoin the infringement, or can choose to waive the 
injunction and instead collect damages from the infringer. 
 
The addition of "put" rules to the picture adds an additional column to our matrix.  Note 
that the new rules are reciprocal to the previous liability rules.  The right is still a right to be paid, 
but the decision as to whether to force an exchange has been placed in the hands of the other 
party vis a vis the corresponding liability rule.  Here again the hope is to harness the private 
information of the parties, by placing the choice of remedies into the hands of whichever party is 
in the best position to make a private valuation that will align with the public interest. 
                                                 
18 Madeline Morris, The Structure of Entitlements, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 822, 854-56 (1993); Ian Ayres & J.M. 





This entitlement structure is relatively rare compared to the other allocations in the table.  
Property rules are of course well known and well established in law.  Liability or "call" type 
rules are also relatively well known in the law.  "Put" type rules are less well known, but can be 
identified if one knows what to look for.  Ayres has identified several examples where this type 
of rule is employed at common law, allowing an asset holder to essentially force a sale of the 
particular asset.19 
 
So for example, if Hilty steals my toothbrush, at common law, I can elect to sue either for 
an injunction to force him to return the toothbrush, or alternatively for damages to force him to 
pay me the value of the toothbrush.20  In other words, I have a choice whether to force him to 
return the item he has taken or to pay me for it.  It is fairly easy to see why I might want to have 
the choice between the two remedies, particularly if I suspect that he may have been using the 
toothbrush.  In that case I may prefer the money over the restoration of the item.  But the key 
point is that I can make the choice, requiring him to in effect buy the item from me if I prefer that 
outcome. 
 
Similarly, if Hilty and I own adjacent parcels of land, and he builds a wall that extends 
over my side of the property line, encroaching on my land, I can sue either for an injunction to 
force him to tear down the wall, or in the alternative, I can sue to force him to pay me the value 
                                                 
19  See Ayres, supra note 4 at 800. 
20  Id. at 815. 
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of the land on which the wall is situated.21  Again, I have the choice whether to recover the real 
property or to receive a payment.  In effect, I can force him to buy the land on which the wall is 
situated if I prefer that outcome to recovering the land. 
 
 
Advantages of Divided Entitlements 
 
These type of asset allocations effectively create divided entitlements to the asset.  
Property rights as traditionally formulated under Rules 1 and 2 are largely binary: one party 
receives the entire allocation, the other party receives nothing.  But under call and put type 
allocations, each party receives something: either the right to possession of the asset, or the right 
to alienate the asset and receive a payment.22  Giving each party a stake in the outcome, and 
allowing the party with the most valuation information to choose the allocation of the respective 
rights, tends to move the property to its best use in light of the events that have engendered the 
cause of action.  This also helps ameliorate the problems associated with bilateral monopolies.  
Bilateral monopolies are known for producing a negotiating stand-off, where each party may try 
to hold out for the full value of the entitlement.  Dividing entitlements ensures that the fortunes 
of the parties are tied together by the overlapping value of the shared entitlements, giving them 
an incentive to move past a stand-off.23 
 
This can be seen in familiar intellectual property allocations.  Despite all the discussion 
about patents and other intellectual property as strong, presumably unitary property rules, 
divided entitlements are by no means unknown in intellectual property.24  Perhaps the best 
known example is found in the doctrine of blocking patents where one party may hold a patent 
covering a class of innovations, and another follow-on improver may simultaneously hold a 
patent covering a specific improvement or sub-class covered by the broader patent.  Such 
improvers are effectively in a situation of bilateral monopoly; neither can exploit that particular 
improvement without coming to terms with the other.  This effectively divides the value of the 
improvement between the two patent holders, and ensures that improvers always have some 
incentive to develop existing technologies.25   
 
Put- type options may be appropriate where an election might help to deter 
counterproductive or in terrorem use of intellectual property rights.  For example, imagine that 
Hilty develops and markets an improvement to an existing widget.  The holder of a patent to 
such widgets sues Hilty, perhaps even obtaining a preliminary injunction against marketing the 
improvement.  Hilty ultimately prevails at trial, showing either that the underlying patent is 
invalid or uninfringed – but by now the market opportunity for the device has passed, and even 
though he is free to use the widget, all the latest models of the device use some other type of 
widget.  If given the Rule 5 option, Hilty might prefer to waive the right to continue using the 
widget and instead collect damages from the patent owner for the sales that he would have made 
had he been left in peace – in effect, forcing the patent owner to buy the improvement.  In fact, 
                                                 
21  Id. 
22 Carol Rose, The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L. REV. 2175 (1997). 
23  Id. 
24 See Burk, supra note 3 at 142-43. 
25 Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEXAS L. REV. 989 (1997). 
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under such circumstances, something like Rule 5 helps cure a version of the patent “troll” 
problem. 
 
Such “put” type option structures can also be seen in some types of administrative 
programs.  For example, this type of option is effectively built in to government programs to buy 
back guns or to exchange dirty needles.26  Possessors of these items can in effect demand a 
payment for a gun, or a new needle in exchange for an old needle.  Such programs are intended 
to get either guns or needles off the streets.  We might ask ourselves whether put options could 
equally well be used to get bad patents off the streets. 
 
Our current method for getting bad patents off the streets involves a type of call option: 
patent owners pay periodic maintenance fees to continue their period of exclusivity.27  A patent 
owner who decides not to pay the fee ends the patent term early -- in other words, patent owners 
can opt to buy additional increments of time on the patent.  This is in essence a call option, the 
right to buy additional time at a fixed price.  A patent owner who decides that the patent is not 
valuable enough to warrant the payment can allow the patent to lapse, taking the patent "off the 
street." 
 
Now imagine a different system, built around a put option.  Under such a system, an 
issued patent would be accompanied not by an option to purchase additional time, but by an 
option to force the issuing authority -- the patent office -- to buy back the patent at a fixed price. 
Some thought would need to go into setting the exact exercise price for the put, but I would 
imagine that the price should be something less than the average cost of obtaining a patent, or 
perhaps it would be some percentage, say 90% of the actual cost of obtaining the particular 
patent in question.  Suppose, just to pick a number, that the exercise price is set at 5000 Euros.  
Now the patent owner knows that at any time she can assert the option to have the patent bought 
back at 5000 Euros.  If she estimates that the patent is worth at least 5000 Euros, she will keep it; 
if she estimates it is worth less to her, she will sell it back.  This removes patents that are 
impractical or uninteresting or otherwise likely to be unworked. 
 
This type of system may have additional advantages besides removing derelict patents 
from the marketplace.  An additional feature of a put-type option is the extra value that attaches 
to the particular asset.  The asset owner has not only the primary asset, but also the value of the 
put -- indeed, under the right circumstances, the two can be monetized and traded separately; the 
put itself can become a separate asset.28   
 
In the case of intellectual property, where we frequently purport to create entitlements as 
an incentive to invest in innovative or creative activity, the addition of a put to the underlying 
entitlement may have interesting benefits.  Because the put adds additional value to an 
entitlement such as a patent, the owner may be willing to invest more.29  Additionally, attaching 
a put to the basic entitlement places a definite and non-speculative asset into the hands of the 
                                                 
26 See Morris, supra note 14 at 855. 
27 Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual Property Law, 55 AM. U.L. REV. 
845, 880 (2006). 
28 See Ayres, supra note 4 at 805. 
29  Id. at 800. 
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patent owner.  She always knows the patent is worth at least 5000 Euros.  This may be helpful in 
attracting outside investment.  A portfolio of such patent puts could be advantageous in fostering 
innovative start-ups and entrepreneurial initiatives.  Indeed, the put need not be attached to 
patents across the board, but might be confined to desirable industries that are particularly risky 




 I should be clear that I am not necessarily endorsing issuing patents subject to a put, or 
even giving an alleged infringer who prevails at trial a damages remedy.  Neither am I 
necessarily endorsing reverse liability for non-practicing entities, although all these options seem 
to me worth exploring.  And this is of course precisely what I am endorsing: that we begin 
looking for scenarios where alternative entitlement structures could be put to use.  I have 
confined myself here to a few examples involving patents, but the range of inquiry of course 
ought to include other form of intellectual property such as copyright, trademark, trade secrecy 
and industrial design.  The range of diversity in intellectual property guarantees a variety of 
situations in which alternative entitlement structures might be beneficial. 
 
As Hilty and others have demonstrated, confining ourselves to exclusory rights is simply 
not enough.  Perhaps the most common trope regarding intellectual property is that it is property, 
like real property, and should be treated as such.30  Unfortunately, this usually means treating it 
according to a very narrow ideological approach to exclusivity.  Taking the rhetoric about 
“property” at face value, I hold that we should rather open intellectual property to the full range 
of entitlement structures that have evolved to accommodate myriad different asset allocations.31  
I have shown in other work with Mark Lemley that technology is diverse, the innovation profiles 
of different industries are diverse, and that only a panoply of diverse incentive mechanisms can 
be expected to foster innovation in these many different environments.32  Greater attention to 
compulsory licenses and related allocative rules adds to the kit of legal tools available to 
accomplish such goals. 
                                                 
30 See, e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual Property is Still Property, 13 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 108 (1990). 
31 See Burk, supra note 3 at 126. 
32 See DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009). 
